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In India, privacy was declared a fundamental right a few years ago. Since 
2013, however, the government has introduced a panoply of digital-surveil-
lance measures, normalising the shift from targeted surveillance to mass 
surveillance. Attempts to integrate the public and private information of 
citizens without strong privacy laws and external oversight indicate India’s 
worrying slide towards a rights-restrictive “surveillance democracy.”
 • The emergent surveillance regime involves the state, technological companies, 
and people themselves, who may collaborate to monitor fellow citizens. While 
those surveilled are overexposed, the surveillants remain opaque. This increas-
es the chances of rights violations, especially of the traditionally marginalised.
 • The functional scope of surveillance has increased with massive digitalisation. 
It is now part of governance, doubling up as an early-warning system against 
security threats and a behaviour-moderating system of social management and 
control.
 • New means of surveillance include artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled facial-
recognition technology and drones that have been mainstreamed into public 
life without statutory basis or the consent of the surveilled. Digital surveillance 
is cost-effective for the state, while increasing harm to the public in cases of 
biased databases and technological errors.
 • COVID-19 has securitised the concept of public-health surveillance by conflat-
ing it with public order. This has increased the data burden on private citizens, 
who can be denied access to public provisions and places if they do not pro-
vide their personal information. Without proper safeguards, surveillance can 
become a tool of exclusion and repression.
Policy Implications
The European Union can hold India, as well as tech companies, to its own strict 
privacy standards. Data-driven global interactions and digital dependencies 
necessitate this. To prevent AI products and dual-use surveillance technologies 
from being used by states against their own citizens, the EU can define and list 
high-risk ones, deny wide exemptions to states, and incentivise privacy-focused 
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Towards Surveillance Democracy
In early April 2021, as millions of Hindu pilgrims thronged the banks of the Gan-
ges in Haridwar, India, to celebrate the festival of Kumbh Mela, artificial intel-
ligence (AI)-enabled cameras zeroed-in on faces without masks and bodies that 
violated the physical-distance rule. With corona cases surging past 100,000 per 
day, surveillance technologies like facial-recognition cameras and drones were 
meant to convey a sense of security. While the pilgrims were not charged for in-
fractions, invasive surveillance technologies and predictive policing have posed 
serious threats to individual liberties under the cover of community safety and 
crowd control.
In the past few years, police in several Indian states have routinised the use of 
fingerprint- and facial recognition technology (FRT) to stop and screen people on 
grounds of suspicion. From polling booths to public-transport systems to schools, 
the use of close-circuit television (CCTV) and FRT on adults and children is turn-
ing vital public spaces into privacy-violating zones. In 2019 and 2020/2021, FRT 
and drones were used on civilians protesting against the contentious Citizenship 
Amendment Act and farm laws. By scanning, recording, and storing facial and 
gait data of protesters, the police sought to match their images with mugshot 
databases (such as voter identity and driving licence) and social media pages. 
Such technologies tend to have high error rates and are subject to the biases of 
their human coders (Bailey, Burkell, and Steeves 2020). Faces can be wrongly 
matched, leading to false arrest. After the 2020 Delhi riots, FRT – with an accu-
racy rate of 2 per cent or less, as per a 2018 statement of the Delhi Police – was 
used to recognise over 1,900 people as rioters. 
Digital surveillance enables dragnet surveillance, which makes everyone a 
suspect. This is ethically problematic: people are not just observed but are pin-
pointed and profiled without their consent. 
While this indicates the policing aspect of mass surveillance, the more per-
vasive issue here relates to the datafication of individuals (turning the identity 
and activity of human beings into quantifiable data) for governance and busi-
ness purposes. This exposes individuals to the constant glare of states and private 
companies. Martin Moore warned in Democracy Hacked (2018) of surveillance 
democracy being a distortion of digital democracy. India faces this prospect. On 
16 March 2020, an investigative report revealed that the Narendra Modi govern-
ment was in the final stages of creating an auto-updating “360-degree database,” 
the Social Registry Information System, to track every aspect of the lives of every 
Indian (Shrivastava 2020). This would use India’s Aadhaar, the world’s largest 
biometric-identity system. There was also a proposal to geo-tag every home. As 
per media reports, this was to ensure welfare schemes reached their targeted 
groups.
Trading privacy for better governance or convenience has consequences. Re-
gardless of the subjective prioritising of privacy by individuals, it needs to be 
valorised as a linchpin right. It affects the rights to speech and expression, to 
protest, and to not be discriminated against. Digital surveillance is more invasive 
than traditional surveillance. It can monitor people’s activities, associations, lo-
cations, emotions, and vital signs. Privacy experts warn against reducing individ-
uals to disembodied data; instead, citizens’ data should be treated with the same 
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consideration as their physical well-being (van der Ploeg 2005; Radhakrishnan 
2020). This is more so in the age of biometric surveillance, as any data leak-
age, mistake, or manipulation can lead to bodily harm in terms of denial of an 
individual’s identity and right to access essential provisions. The COVID-19 pan-
demic has added to this threat by securitising public-health surveillance, making 
it over-reliant on tech tools. 
India, therefore, represents a large digitalising democracy where, in the ab-
sence of a data-protection law, digital surveillance by multiple actors is taking 
diverse forms despite a Supreme Court ruling declaring privacy to be a funda-
mental right linked with those to life and livelihood (K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of 
India 2017). This emergent surveillance regime is hence analysed here. In clos-
ing, policy recommendations are offered for the European Union on regulating 
surveillance technologies and ensuring data privacy for a rapidly changing envir-
onment shaped by the pandemic, with the salience of the fourth generation of 
human rights on digital needs having increased.
Security-Based Mass Surveillance
In 2013, before the former Central Intelligence Agency analyst Edward Snowden 
exposed government-sponsored mass surveillance programmes like the National 
Security Agency’s (NSA) PRISM in the United States and TEMPORA of Govern-
ment Communications Headquarters in the United Kingdom, India launched 
a similar surveillance behemoth: the Central Monitoring System (CMS). Like 
PRISM, initiated after the attacks of 11 September 2001, the CMS was conceptu-
alised after the attacks in Mumbai of 2008 to aid counterterrorism activities. In 
tracking terrorist and criminal activities, it got backdoor entry to citizens’ data. 
Strategic surveillance by democracies expanded from international to domestic 
communications.
The CMS signalled two key changes in old-school surveillance: First, the state 
announced its move from targeted surveillance of criminals to lawful interception 
of people’s private conversations as per threat perception. Second, surveillance 
was no longer limited to gathering and storing data. It now involved real-time 
monitoring of the voice calls, Internet searches, and online activity of potentially 
anyone with a mobile phone, landline, and Internet connection. Unlike the NSA, 
which required court approval to spy on calls and emails (though without public 
scrutiny), the CMS could work without court or even legislative approval. Apart 
from no external oversight to ensure accountability and prevent the abuse of 
power, there is no redressal mechanism for individuals whose rights get violated.
This centralised infrastructure of surveillance has hi-tech scaffolding sup-
porting it like the National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID), Network Traffic Anal-
ysis (NETRA), and Crime and Criminal Tracking Network Systems (CCTNS). 
NATGRID, conceptualised as a master database fed by several government de-
partments and ministries, would give intelligence and investigative agencies ac-
cess to citizens’ data including details of bank accounts, telephone records, pass-
ports, and vehicle registration. NETRA would automatically intercept voice calls 
over the Internet if they were red-flagged by keywords like “bomb” and “attack.” 
In 2014, a report based on multiple Right to Information (RTI) appeals revealed 
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that more than 100,000 telephone interception orders were issued by the central 
government each year (SFLC 2014). This figure could be much higher if orders by 
various state governments were tallied. The CCTNS is an online tracking system 
for crimes and criminals linking 14,000 police stations. 
This infrastructure has grown. India is set to create the world’s largest gov-
ernment-operated facial-recognition database, the Automated Facial Recognition 
System (AFRS) – with an estimated budget of INR 308 crore (USD 41.62 mil-
lion; EUR 34.58 million). This would identify anyone from CCTV and video by 
matching facial biometrics with images from multiple sources. As police often 
use vague terms like nabbing “suspicious individuals,” “habitual protesters,” and 
“rowdy elements” to justify their use of FRT (Bhandari 2021), this could be used 
to criminalise protest and curb dissent. While civilians first came under security-
based surveillance, they were further exposed by governance-based surveillance. 
Governance-Based Mass Surveillance
Surveillance as part of governance was brought to the forefront by Aadhaar (“Foun-
dation” in Hindi), as launched in 2009. It provides Indians with a 12-digit unique 
identity number based on their biometric and demographic data to facilitate access 
to public goods and services. It received legal backing in 2016, but raised serious 
privacy concerns when the government started pushing people to link their Aad-
haar ID with phone numbers, bank accounts, pensions, and similar – exposing 
them to the state’s disciplinary gaze. This was done by aggregating confidential 
information about individuals to create their digital duplicate. This made it dif-
ficult for people to carry out everyday transactions without having this digital 
duplicate. For example, a national-election survey conducted by the Delhi-based 
research organisation CSDS-Lokniti in 2019 showed that due to the linking of 
ration cards with Aadhaar, a number of respondents from low-income groups 
were denied food grains either because they did not have an Aadhaar ID or due to 
technical glitches (Sardesai 2021). Aadhaar was transforming an essential norm 
of people providing their private information based on “informed consent” to that 
of now “compelled consent.” 
In 2018, during Supreme Court hearings, a group of lawyers warned against 
linking Aadhaar with the National Register of Citizens (to document legal citi-
zens). The Modi government plans to implement this across India. The lawyers 
feared this could be used for “blacklisting” individuals as non-citizens, denying 
them access to welfare provisions (Bhatia 2020). Now there is a proposal for a Na-
tional Digital Health ID, which would store an individual’s health-related infor-
mation. In the absence of a data-privacy law, the state could be privy to the most 
intimate details of a citizen if this is eventually linked with Aadhaar (Chandran 
2020). This could especially affect sexual minorities. Further, this data could be 
used for other purposes as this policy allows the state to share anonymised data 
with third parties. If this health ID is made mandatory, it would mean a denial of 
certain related services to those who decide to opt out. 
Apart from harm by the state, people are vulnerable to external parties in 
case of data breaches too. In May 2017, for example, India’s Centre for Internet 
and Society pointed out that 130 Aadhaar numbers along with other sensitive 
   5    GIGA FOCUS | ASIA | NO. 3 | MAY 2021 
data were available on the Internet. Digital surveillance, while expanding the 
powers of states to surveil, has also brought on board private actors with even 
greater capacities to grab mass data. Social media platforms emerged as data-rich 
sites of surveillance. 
Social Media Surveillance
Canadian political-communications expert Vincent Mosco (2014: 10) spoke of 
a surveillance state reinforced by “surveillance capitalism” (companies using 
big-data analytics to track and target users for profit). In the EU, the scale of 
this tracking is reduced due to the General Data Protection Regulation 2016/69 
(GDPR). In India, tech platforms can easily surveil users. India has not enacted 
its Data (Privacy and Protection) Bill 2017 and Personal Data and Information 
Privacy Code Bill 2019 (modelled after the GDPR). The latter, in its current form, 
gives wide exemptions to the government in accessing people’s sensitive personal 
data. 
Freedom House’s “Freedom on the Net 2019” reported that governments are 
increasingly relying on social media to spy on their citizens. In 2019, Facebook in 
its “Transparency Report” stated that India was second only to the US in request-
ing the company provide users’ data; it had complied in 53 per cent of cases. In 
2020, two years after the Supreme Court stopped the government from creating 
a Social Media Communication Hub to monitor the social media accounts of citi-
zens, the Modi administration started planning for a surveillance tool to monitor 
individual users. Forty government departments already have access to a social 
media surveillance tool called Advanced Application for Social Media Analytics 
(AASMA) to collect live data of users from multiple social networks, do sentiment 
analysis on the content they post, track their location, and alert authorities ac-
cordingly. 
With social media, surveillance functions and laws evolved – from the inter-
ception of voice calls by the Indian Telegraph Act (1887) to interception of digi-
tal communications by the Information Technology Act/IT Act (2000, 2008) to 
monitoring online media content by the IT (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital 
Media Ethics Code) Rules (2021). The state could legally monitor digital content 
on any device or platform and prosecute anyone for vaguely stated offences like 
threats to the sovereignty, integrity, or security of India or having friendly rela-
tions with foreign states. Arresting people for satire or criticism of the govern-
ment is a new form of repression. Several states in India have misused the IT 
Act to arrest people for social media posts (Section 66A of the Act) and to block/
takedown web pages and accounts (Section 69A of the Act). The fact that social 
media was now a space of surveillance had a chilling effect on self-expression. 
The Supreme Court repealed Section 66A in 2015, but the police still use it to 
make unconstitutional arrests regardless. 
Social media surveillance adopts the tactic of “content moderation.” On 12 
February 2021, during the farmers’ protests, Twitter blocked 97 per cent of the 
accounts the Modi government ordered it to. These accounts had been highly 
critical of the government. The online space, projected as the stronghold of free 
speech, was further gagged by the IT Rules passed on 25 February 2021. The 
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government could now decide which social media posts, streaming shows, and 
digital news could be taken down. Even the final frontier of privacy – encrypted 
services like WhatsApp – has come under the state’s scrutiny. In the past five 
years,  WhatsApp claims to have securely delivered over 100 trillion messages to 
over two billion users globally, with India being its largest market. The govern-
ment could ask companies to break their own privacy-respecting encryption. 
Industry Support
Private companies are equipping the state with new means of surveillance. The 
“Spy Files” project of the whistle-blower website Wikileaks revealed Indian com-
panies to be in the top league of the global surveillance industry. With law en-
forcement and military agencies as their major clients, Indian companies have 
been innovating on facial- and fingerprint recognition, predictive intel, decryp-
tors, and, now, COVID-19 tech for homeland security.
Companies like FaceTagr and StaqU provide FRT and AI solutions to police. 
Mobineer Info Systems is building a smart-policing app called E-Beat Book for 
foot-patrol police that would include FRT to match people’s faces with databases 
and obtain information on them rapidly. Kommlabs Dezign sells interception so-
lutions that reveal what people sound and feel like, and not just what they say. 
They have AI-enabled solutions to detect cognitive and emotional stress in voice 
calls. Like FRT, Emotion Recognition Technology is the sunrise sector of the sur-
veillance industry. It is highly controversial, as biases are baked into the system. 
This can lead to a future where someone is arrested because they sound guilty. 
India is also among the leading countries in CCTV surveillance. Videonetics helps 
in video surveillance. Shoghi Communications provides surveillance tech to na-
tional-security agencies. ClearTrail and Comtrail provide tech for the intercep-
tion and monitoring of voice and internet data. Foreign companies like, among 
others, China’s ZTE, Japan’s NEC, the US’s Verint Systems, and Germany’s Fin-
Fisher and Utimaco add to this arsenal. 
Lateral Surveillance
The state’s power to surveil people for security and governance, boosted by tech 
and private companies, has another supportive actor: people themselves. In Feb-
ruary 2021, the Ministry of Home Affairs launched a controversial programme 
inviting private citizens to report on unlawful activities on the Internet and social 
media. The Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre (14C) invited citizens to be-
come Cyber Volunteer Unlawful Content Flaggers, Cyber Awareness Promoters, 
and Cyber Experts. The fear is that citizens who support the ruling party can eas-
ily volunteer as Content Flaggers to muzzle critics and dissenters and get them 
arrested, similar to China’s community monitors under its grid-management 
system of granular surveillance. This fear is real: a database on sedition cases 
compiled by Article 14, an Indian news and investigations site, revealed that 96 
per cent of those filed against 405 individuals for criticising politicians and gov-
ernments over the last decade were registered after the Modi government came to 
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power in 2014 (Purohit 2021). Human Rights Watch in its “World Report 2020” 
also documented the growing arrest of critics and opponents of ruling political 
parties both at the centre and in some states. These cases were often filed by par-
tisan supporters.
Another variation of this surveillance has been vicious trolling as well as 
threat of arrests for online content the public supporters of the ruling party de-
scribe as being anti-Indian or hurting religious sentiments (Ellis-Petersen 2020). 
Societal distrust grows as people censor one another. Citizens are no longer com-
munity-level watchers and reporters. Instead, they are arrogating to themselves 
policing powers (Swaminathan and Saluja 2021). 
Pandemic Surveillance
The pandemic has encouraged citizen vigilantism powered by the rationale of 
public health. In 2020, there were cases of Residents Welfare Associations (self-
administering bodies in housing complexes and colonies) in the northern cities of 
Noida and Gurugram forcing residents, visitors, domestic workers, and other ser-
vice providers to use the government’s contact-tracing app Aarogya Setu (“Bridge 
of Health” in Hindi). They acted as extensions of the state. The government would 
make the app mandatory for travel to public or private workplaces and by train, 
subway, and airplane.
This represents a new normal of surveillance: people were now asked to wear 
or carry the means of their own surveillance. This body-tagged (wearable devices) 
and geo-tagged (smart device-based pandemic trackers) surveillance is not limit-
ed to identifying and isolating infected individuals, but fining and arresting them 
in case of lockdown or quarantine violations. There are currently 120 contact-
tracing apps across 71 countries in existence. As per the COVID-19 Digital Rights 
Tracker, Aarogya Setu is the most downloaded among them (with more than 100 
million users). It has privacy issues, as it is seeded with people’s personal details. 
It uses static identifier (reducing potential for anonymity), and collects more in-
formation than required – thus violating the “purpose limitation” (data collected 
for a specific purpose and not used for other ones), “data minimisation” (basic 
amount of data collected to fulfil a specific purpose), legality, and proportionality 
requirements of India’s privacy ruling of 2017 and the GDPR (Internet Freedom 
Foundation 2021). On 30 March 2021, an RTI document by lawyer Saurav Das 
revealed that the Jammu and Kashmir administration had shared the app’s data 
about people’s health with the police, violating purpose limitation.
Sensitive health data needs the highest level of protection. Aarogya Setu, 
however, does not hold the government liable for violations of data privacy. It 
also demonstrates the pitfalls of techno-solutionism, as it is not error-proof. 
There have been incidences of false negatives and false positives. India, like 21 
other countries including Australia, France, and the US, is using drones to surveil 
people and enforce COVID-19 measures. Drones capture body and location data, 
and are not bound by privacy clauses. This has generated deep-seated fear among 
the surveilled, increasing the stigmatisation and targeting of already-vulnerable 
groups like women, Muslims, daily wage earners, gig workers, and the transgen-
der community (Radhakrishnan 2020).
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In a continuation of the government’s practice of digitally interlinking databases, 
Aarogya Setu has been integrated with the vaccination portal Co-Win. The In-
ternet Freedom Foundation has warned this may lead to passive surveillance of 
those who register and denial of services to those who do not. Also, the National 
Health Authority of India is planning to make access to vaccines contingent on 
identity verification through FRT, an imprecise technology. This could lead to 
“potentially life-threatening exclusion” (@internetfreedom 19 April 2021). 
A few states in India have come up with their own contact-tracing apps: for 
example, Karnataka’s Quarantine Watch requiring sharing of selfies as part of 
quarantine verification and Jharkhand’s Sahayta (“Help” in Hindi) requiring mi-
grants to register with selfies, bank details, and Aadhaar number to receive finan-
cial support. In case of technical problems, they could be denied such assistance.
Pandemic surveillance also involves social media surveillance. On 25 April 
2021, for example, as the country battled with more than 300,000 COVID-19 
cases per day and acute shortages of oxygen, intensive-care-unit beds, and criti-
cal medicines, the Indian government asked Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram 
to take down around 100 posts and accounts panning their handling of the pan-
demic. Twitter geo-blocked 52 tweets, including one of a member of parliament 
and one of a member of the legislative assembly. 
Public health should be about medical solutions, not surveillance that crimi-
nalises people. COVID-19 provides the inflection point for a transvaluation of 
surveillance. Urgent policies are needed for course-correction. 
Safeguards Against Surveillance
Multi-actor and diverse means of digital surveillance require multilevel respons-
es. The EU can strengthen their standard-setting role here. The Indian case offers 
comparative lessons, as the EU member states are themselves increasingly de-
ploying FRT and biometrics for mass surveillance (Nash 2021). There is a need to 
heed the authoritarian creep in democracies enabled by digital surveillance. Also, 
the fact that data-driven global exchanges need mutual privacy protection has 
raised the stakes. The EU may hold countries like India with whom they closely 
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For India, legal guidelines have already been laid down by the 2017 Supreme 
Court ruling and “Justice A.P. Shah Report” (2012) on privacy. These are in line 
with Articles 12 and 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the United Nations General 
Assembly Resolution on the Right to Privacy in the Digital Age (A/Res/68/167), 
and the GDPR. 
To prevent big-data misappropriation through security- and governance-
based surveillance, the EU may nudge states like India to adopt a privacy law 
that does not give wide exemptions to the government. This law may extend the 
definition of unfair trade practices to include harmful types of data surveillance. 
This law could discourage practices like centralised databases that integrate pub-
lic and private information or compel people to barter biometric data for public 
goods. Privacy experts in India have suggested having separate databases with 
purpose and storage limitations. They also recommend a rights-respecting pan-
demic surveillance that does not reveal the personal details of people in contact-
tracing apps and criminalise the afflicted. 
Beyond India, certain global measures are needed to prevent tech-enabled 
abuse. Surveillance tech developed and exported by the EU countries has been 
used by states against their own citizens. Two recent EU measures seek to coun-
ter this. While laudatory, they need work. The first is the EU’s rules on dual-use 
surveillance tech adopted in March 2021. Now reasons for approving or denying 
export licences would be made public, and surveillance tech would have to pass 
the human rights test. To ensure compliance, the EU may need to expand the 
definition of “cyber surveillance” to include biometric forms, update the list of 
cyber-surveillance applications that pose a high risk to civil liberties, and make 
state and corporate actors clearly liable for violations. The second is the EU’s 
framework to regulate AI practices that cause physical and psychological harm, 
as published in April 2021. This proposal falls short of fully proscribing discrimi-
natory AI applications by giving exemptions to the state. Advocacy groups like 
European Digital Rights have asked the EU to draw clear red lines against harm-
ful AI and ban risky tech like FRT.
Apart from the human rights aspect, the EU can enhance the economic value 
of privacy. GDPR drove the establishment of many privacy-related tech start-ups 
around the world. In India, as in Europe, there is a growing demand for privacy-
by-design products, browsers, and messaging services. Economic policies by the 
EU that incentivise privacy- rather than surveillance tech may compel big and 
emergent tech companies to value privacy as part of their business model. This 
could work alongside strengthening Internet-governance norms to debar track-
ers from profiling people, algorithms from manipulating them, and states from 
coercing platforms into giving them sensitive user data and censoring people in 
the name of content moderation. 
This emergent surveillance regime, as exemplified by the case of India, neces-
sitates an expanded definition of “the right to privacy.” People should have a say 
in the rules governing their own surveillance. The current pandemic has made 
this of the essence, as control over data is control over bodies.
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